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We present a simple method to obtain an upper bound on the achievable secret key rate in
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that use only unidirectional classical communication
during the public-discussion phase. This method is based on a necessary precondition for one-
way secret key distillation; the legitimate users need to prove that there exists no quantum state
having a symmetric extension that is compatible with the available measurements results. The main
advantage of the obtained upper bound is that it can be formulated as a semidefinite program, which
can be efficiently solved. We illustrate our results by analyzing two well-known qubit-based QKD
protocols: the four-state protocol and the six-state protocol. Recent results by Renner et al. [1]
also show that the given precondition is only necessary but not sufficient for unidirectional secret
key distillation.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2, 3] allows two par-
ties (Alice and Bob) to generate a secret key despite the
computational and technological power of an eavesdrop-
per (Eve) who interferes with the signals. This secret key
is the essential ingredient of the one-time-pad or Vernam
cipher [4], which can provide information-theoretic secure
communications.
Practical QKD protocols distinguish two phases in or-
der to generate a secret key: a quantum phase and a clas-
sical phase. In the quantum phase a physical apparatus
generates classical data for Alice and Bob distributed ac-
cording to a joint probability distribution p(ai, bj) ≡ pij .
In the classical phase, Alice and Bob try to distill a se-
cret key from pij by means of a public discussion over an
authenticated classical channel.
Two types of QKD schemes are used to create the cor-
related data pij . In entanglement based (EB) schemes,
a source, which is assumed to be under Eve’s control,
produces a bipartite quantum state ρAB that is dis-
tributed to Alice and Bob. Eve could even have a
third system entangled with those given to the legiti-
mate users. Alice and Bob measure each incoming sig-
nal by means of two positive operator valued measures
(POVM) [5] {Ai} and {Bj}, respectively, and they ob-
tain pij = Tr(Ai ⊗Bj ρAB).
In an ideal prepare and measure (PM) schemes, Alice
prepares a pure state |ϕi〉 with probability pi and sends
it to Bob. On the receiving side, Bob measures each
received signal with a POVM {Bj}. The signal prepa-
ration process in PM schemes can be also thought of
as follows [6]: First, Alice produces the bipartite state
|ψsource〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉A|ϕi〉B and, afterwards, she
measures the first subsystem in the orthogonal basis
|αi〉A corresponding to the measurementsAi = |αi〉A〈αi|.
This action generates the (non-orthogonal) signal states
|ϕi〉 with probabilities pi. In PM schemes the reduced
density matrix of Alice, ρA = TrB(|ψsource〉AB〈ψsource|),
is fixed and cannot be modified by Eve. To include this
information in the measurement process one can add to
the observables {Ai ⊗ Bj}, measured by Alice and Bob,
other observables {Ck ⊗ 1 } such that they form a tomo-
graphic complete set of Alice’s Hilbert space [7, 8]. In
the most general PM scheme Alice is free to prepare ar-
bitrary states ρi instead of only pure states |ϕi〉. One can
apply the same framework as for the ideal PM scheme,
as reviewed in App. A.
From now on, we will consider that pij and {Ai ⊗Bj}
refer always to the complete set of measurements, i.e.,
they include also the observables {Ck ⊗ 1 } for PM
schemes.
The public discussion performed by Alice and Bob dur-
ing the classical phase of QKD can involve either one-way
or two-way classical communication. Two-way classical
communication is more robust than one-way in terms of
the amount of errors that the QKD protocol can toler-
ate in order to distill a secret key [9]. However, the first
security proof of QKD by Mayers [10], and the most com-
monly known proof by Shor and Presskill [11] are based
on one-way communications, and many other security
proofs of QKD belong also to this last paradigm [12, 13].
Moreover, any two-way communication protocol includes
a final non-trivial step that is necessarily only one-way,
so that the study of one-way communication is also useful
for the study of two-way communication.
In this paper we concentrate on one-way classical com-
munication protocols during the public discussion phase.
Typically, these schemes consist of three steps: local pre-
processing of the data, information reconciliation to cor-
rect the data, and privacy amplification to decouple the
data from Eve [14]. Depending on the allowed direc-
tion of communication, two different cases must be con-
sidered. Direct communication refers to communication
from Alice to Bob, reverse reconciliation allows com-
2munication from Bob to Alice only. (See, for instance,
[15, 16].) We will consider only the case of direct com-
munication. Expressions for the opposite scenario, i.e.,
reverse reconciliation, can be directly obtained simply
by renaming Alice and Bob. Note that for typical ex-
periments, the joint probability distribution pij is not
symmetric, so that the qualitative statements for both
cases will differ.
We address the question of how much secret key can be
obtained from the knowledge of pij and {Ai ⊗Bj}. This
is one of the most important figures of merit in order to
compare the performance of different QKD schemes. We
consider the so-called trusted device scenario, where Eve
cannot modify the actual detection devices employed by
Alice and Bob. (See Refs. [8, 17].) We assume that the
legitimate users have complete knowledge about their de-
tection devices, which are fixed by the actual experiment.
In the last years, several lower and upper bounds on
the secret key rate for particular one-way QKD schemes
have been proposed. The lower bounds come from proto-
cols that have been proven to be secure [1, 11–13, 18, 19].
The upper bounds are generally derived by considering
some particular eavesdropping attack and by determin-
ing when this attack can defeat QKD [1, 19–22]. Un-
fortunately, to evaluate these known bounds for general
QKD protocols is not always a trivial task. Typically, it
demands to solve difficult optimization problems, which
can be done only for some particular QKD protocols [1].
In this paper we present a simple method to obtain an
upper bound on the secret key rate for general one-way
QKD protocols. The obtained upper bound will not be
tight for all QKD schemes, but it has the advantage that
it is straightforward to evaluate in general since it can be
formulated as a semidefinite program [23, 24]. Such in-
stances of convex optimization problems can be efficiently
solved, for example by means of interior-point methods
[23, 24]. Our analysis is based on a necessary precondi-
tion for one-wayQKD: The legitimate users need to prove
that there exists no quantum state having a symmetric
extension that is compatible with the available measure-
ment results [25]. This kind of states (with symmetric
extensions) have been recently analyzed in Refs. [26–28].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we re-
view some known upper bounds on the secret key rate
using one-way post-processing techniques. Sec. III in-
cludes the main result of the paper. Here we introduce a
straightforward method to obtain an upper bound on the
secret key rate for one-way QKD. This result is then il-
lustrated in Sec. IV for two well-known qubit-based QKD
protocols: the four-state [3] and the six-state [29] QKD
schemes. We select these two particular QKD schemes
because they allow us to compare our results with already
known upper bounds in the literature [1, 19–22]. Then
in Sec. V we present our conclusions. The paper includes
also two Appendices. In App. A we consider very briefly
the case of QKD based on mixed signal states instead
of pure states. Finally, App. B contains the semidefi-
nite program needed to actually solve the upper bound
derived in Sec. III.
II. KNOWN UPPER BOUNDS
Different upper bounds on the secret key rate for one-
way QKD have been proposed in the last years. These
results either apply to a specific QKD protocol [20–22],
or they are derived for different starting scenarios of the
QKD scheme [1, 18, 19], e.g., one where Alice and Bob
are still free to design suitable measurements.
Once Alice and Bob have performed their measure-
ments during the quantum phase of the protocol, they
are left with two classical random variables A and B,
respectively, satisfying an observed joint probability dis-
tribution p(ai, bj) ≡ pij . On the other hand, Eve can
keep her quantum state untouched and delay her mea-
surement until the public-discussion phase, realized by
Alice and Bob, has finished.
In order to provide an upper bound on the secret key
rate it is sufficient to consider a particular eavesdropping
strategy. For instance, we can restrict ourselves to col-
lective attacks [1, 19]. This situation can be modelled by
assuming that Alice, Bob, and Eve share an unlimited
number of the so-called ccq states ρccq which are given
by [18]
ρccq =
∑
i,j
pij |ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗ ρi,jE , (1)
where ρi,jE denotes Eve’s conditional quantum state, and
the states {|i〉A} and {|j〉B} form orthonormal basis sets
for Alice and Bob, respectively. As shown in Refs. [1, 19],
in this scenario the rate K→, at which Alice and Bob can
generate a secret key by using only direct communication,
is bounded from above by
K→ ≤ sup
σU←A
σT←A
S(U |ET )− S(U |BT ), (2)
where the supremum is taken over all possible density
operators σU and σT depending on the random variable
A of Alice. The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state
ρ reads as S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ), while the conditional von
Neumann entropy S is defined in terms of von Neumann
entropies itself, i.e., S(U |ET ) = S(UET )− S(ET ). The
upper bound given by Eq. (2) refers to the quantum state
given by Eq. (1) after a local post-processing step. It is
given by [1, 19]
ρUTBE =
∑
i,j
pij σ
i
U ⊗ σiT ⊗ |j〉B〈j| ⊗ ρiE , (3)
where ρiE =
∑
j p(bj |ai)ρi,jE . This upper bound involves
only a single letter optimization problem. However,
the optimization runs over density operators σU and σT
which makes Eq. (2) hard to evaluate.
Another upper bound that applies to the QKD scenario
that we consider here is the Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s secret
3key rate for the one-way classical key-agreement scenario
[30]. Suppose that Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to
many independent realizations of three random variables
A, B, and E, respectively, that are distributed according
to the joint probability distribution p(ai, bj, ek). Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner showed that the one-way secret key rate is
given by [30]
S→(A;B|E) = sup
U←A
T←U
H(U |ET )−H(U |BT ). (4)
The single letter optimization ranges over two clas-
sical channels characterized by the transition proba-
bilities Q(ul|ai) and R(tm|ul), and where the con-
ditional Shannon entropy is defined as H(U |ET ) =
−∑ p(ul, ek, tm) log p(ul|ek, tm). The first channel pro-
duces the secret key U , while the second channel creates
the broadcasted information T .
Note that Eq. (4) provides also an upper bound onK→.
Eve can always measure her subsystem of the ccq state
given by Eq. (1) by means of a POVM {Ek}. As a result,
Alice, Bob, and Eve share the tripartite probability dis-
tribution p(ai, bj, ek) = pij Tr(Ekρ
i,j
E ). Unfortunately,
the optimization problem that one has to solve in order
to obtain S→(A;B|E) is also non-trivial, and its solution
is only known for particular examples. (See Ref. [31].)
Finally, an easy computable upper bound on K→
is given by the classical mutual information I(A;B)
between Alice and Bob [32]. This quantity is de-
fined in terms of the Shannon entropy H(A) =
−∑ p(ai) log p(ai) and the Shannon joint entropy
H(A,B) = −∑ p(ai, bj) log p(ai, bj) as
I(A;B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(A,B). (5)
The mutual information represents an upper bound on
the secret key rate for arbitrary public communication
protocols, hence in particular for one-way communication
protocols [32], i.e.,
K→ ≤ S→(A;B|E) ≤ I(A;B). (6)
To evaluate I(A;B) for the case of QKD, we only need
to use as p(ai, bj) the correlated data pij .
III. UPPER BOUND ON K→
Our starting point is again the observed joint probabil-
ity distribution pij obtained by Alice and Bob after their
measurements. This probability distribution defines an
equivalence class S of quantum states that are compati-
ble with it,
S = {ρAB | Tr(Ai ⊗Bj ρAB) = pij , ∀i, j} . (7)
By definition, every state ρAB ∈ S can represent the state
shared by Alice and Bob before their measurements [47].
Now the idea is simple: just impose some particular
eavesdropping strategy for Eve, and then use one of the
already known upper bounds. (See also Ref. [33].) The
upper bound resulting represents an upper bound for any
possible eavesdropping strategy. The method can be de-
scribed with the following three steps.
(1) Select a particular eavesdropping strategy for Eve.
This strategy is given by the choice of a tripartite quan-
tum state ρABE and a POVM {Ek} to measure Eve’s sig-
nals. The only restriction here is that the chosen strategy
cannot alter the observed data, i.e., TrE(ρABE) ∈ S.
(2) Calculate the joint probability distribution pijk =
Tr(Ai ⊗Bj ⊗ Ek ρABE).
(3) Use an upper bound for K→ given the probability
distribution pijk. Here we can use, for instance, Eq. (4)
or just the mutual information between Alice and Bob
which is straightforward to calculate.
This method can be improved by performing an opti-
mization over all possible measurements on Eve’s system
and over all possible tripartite states that Eve can ac-
cess [48]. This gives rise to a set of possible extensions P
of the observed bipartite probability distribution pij for
the random variables A and B to a tripartite probability
distribution pijk for the random variables A, B, and E.
Now the upper bound is given by
K→ ≤ inf
P
S→, (8)
with S→ representing the chosen quantity in step (3).
In Sec. III A we present a necessary precondition for
one-way QKD. In particular, Alice and Bob need to prove
that there exists no quantum state having a symmetric
extension that is compatible with the available measure-
ments results [25]. Motivated by this necessary precondi-
tion, we introduce a special class of eavesdropping strate-
gies for Eve in Sec. III B. These strategies are based on a
decomposition of quantum states similar to the best sep-
arability approximation [34, 35], but now for states with
symmetric extensions. The general idea followed here is
similar to that presented in Ref. [33] for two-way upper
bounds on QKD.
A. States With Symmetric Extensions & One-Way
QKD
A quantum state ρAB is said to have a symmetric ex-
tension to two copies of system B if and only if there
exists a tripartite state ρABB′ with HB = HB′ which
fulfills the following two properties [26]:
TrB′(ρABB′) = ρAB, (9)
PρABB′P = ρABB′ , (10)
where the operator P satisfies P |ijk〉ABB′ = |ikj〉ABB′ .
This definition can be easily extended to cover also the
case of symmetric extensions of ρAB to two copies of sys-
tem A, and also of extensions of ρAB to more than two
copies of system A or of system B.
States with symmetric extension play an important
role in quantum information theory, as noted recently.
4They can deliver a complete family of separability cri-
teria for the bipartite [26, 27] and for the multipartite
case [28], and they provide a constructive way to create
local hidden variable theories for quantum states [36].
Moreover, they are related to the capacity of quantum
channels [37]. Most important, a connection to one-way
QKD has also been noticed:
Observation 1 [25]: If the observed data pij originate
from a quantum state ρAB which has a symmetric exten-
sion to two copies of system B, then the secret key rate
for unidirectional communication K→ from Alice to Bob
vanishes.
Proof: Suppose that the observed data pij originate
from a state ρAB which has a symmetric extension to
two copies of system B. Suppose as well that the third
subsystem of the extended tripartite state ρABB′ is in
Eve’s hands, i.e., ρABE = ρABB′ . This results in equal
marginal states for Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve, i.e., ρAB =
ρAE . From Alice’s perspective the secret key distillation
task is then completely symmetric under interchanging
Bob and Eve. Since we restrict ourselves to unidirectional
classical communication from Alice to Bob only, we find
that it is impossible for Bob to break this symmetry.
That is, if Alice tries to generate a secret key with Bob
her actions would automatically create exactly the same
secret key with Eve. To complete the proof we need to
verify that Eve can access the symmetric extension ρABB′
of ρAB in both kinds of QKD schemes, EB schemes and
PM schemes. It was demonstrated in Ref. [7] that Eve
can always create a purification of the original state ρAB,
which means that Eve can have access to the symmetric
extension. 
Remark 1: A quantum state ρAB has a symmetric ex-
tension to two copies of system B if and only if there
exists a tripartite state ρABE with equal marginal states
for Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve, i.e., ρAB = ρAE .
Proof: If a quantum state ρAB has a symmetric exten-
sion this automatically implies equal marginal states for
Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve. For the other direction, sup-
pose that there exists a tripartite state ρ˜ABE with equal
marginals, but which is not symmetric under interchange
of subsystems B and E. Then the state P ρ˜ABEP is also
a possible tripartite state with equal marginals. This al-
lows to construct the symmetric extension of the state
ρAB as ρABE = 1/2(ρ˜ABE + P ρ˜ABEP ). 
There exists entangled states which do have symmetric
extensions [26, 27]. Hence, accordingly to Observation 1,
although these states are entangled and therefore poten-
tially useful for two-way QKD [7], they are nevertheless
useless for one-way QKD in the corresponding direction.
We define the best extendibility approximation of a
given state ρAB as the decomposition of ρAB into a state
with symmetric extension, that we denote as σext, and a
state without symmetric extension ρne, while maximizing
the weight of the extendible part σext [49], i.e.,
ρAB = max
λ
λσext + (1− λ)ρne. (11)
This definition follows the same spirit as the best separa-
bility approximation introduced in Refs. [34, 35]. Since
the set of all extendible quantum states forms a closed
and convex set [27], the maximum in Eq. (11) always ex-
ists. We denote the maximum weight of extendibility of
ρAB as λmax(ρAB), where 0 ≤ λmax(ρAB) ≤ 1 is satis-
fied.
Given an equivalence class S of quantum states, we
define the maximum weight of extendibility within the
equivalence class, denoted as λSmax, as
λSmax = max {λmax(ρAB) | ρAB ∈ S} . (12)
This parameter is related to the necessary precondition
for one-way secret key distillation by the following obser-
vation.
Observation 2 : Assume that Alice and Bob can per-
form local measurements with POVM elements Ai and
Bj , respectively, to obtain the joint probability distribu-
tion of the outcomes pij on the distributed quantum state
ρAB. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) The correlations pij can originate from an extendible
state. (2) The maximum weight of extendibility λSmax
within the equivalence class of quantum states S com-
patible with the observed data pij satisfies λ
S
max = 1.
Proof. If pij can originate from an extendible state,
then there exists a σext such as σext ∈ S. Moreover, we
have that any extendible state satisfies λmax(σsep) = 1.
The other direction is trivial. 
Let us define Smax as the equivalence class of quan-
tum states composed of those states ρAB ∈ S that have
maximum weight of extendibility. It is given by
Smax =
{
ρAB ∈ S | λmax(ρAB) = λSmax
}
. (13)
B. Eavesdropping Model
An eavesdropping strategy for our purpose is com-
pletely characterized by selecting the overall tripar-
tite quantum state ρABE and the measurement oper-
ators {Ek}. Again, the only restriction here is that
TrE(ρABE) ∈ S. We consider that Eve chooses a pu-
rification ρABE = |Φ〉ABE〈Φ| of a state ρAB taken from
the equivalence class Smax.
The quantum states σext and ρne of the best extendibil-
ity approximation of ρAB can be written in terms of their
spectral decomposition as [50]
σext =
∑
i
qi|φi〉AB〈φi|, (14)
ρne =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉AB〈ψi|, (15)
with 〈φi|φj〉 = 〈ψi|ψj〉 = 0 for all i 6= j. A possible
purification of the state ρAB is given by
|Φ〉ABE =
∑
i
√
λSmaxqi|φi〉AB|tk = ext, fi〉E +
∑
j
√
(1− λSmax)pj |ψj〉AB |tk = ne, fj〉E , (16)
5where the states {|tk = ext, fi〉, |tk = ne, fj〉} form an or-
thogonal bases on Eve’s subsystem.
It is important to note that in both kinds of QKD
schemes, EB schemes and PM schemes, Eve can always
have access to the state |Φ〉ABE given by Eq. (16). This
has been shown in Ref. [7]. In an EB scheme this is
clear since Eve is the one who prepares the state ρAB
and who distributes it to Alice and Bob. In the case of
PM schemes we need to show additionally that Eve can
obtain the state |Φ〉ABE by interaction with Bob’s sys-
tem only. In the Schmidt decomposition the state pre-
pared by Alice, |ψsource〉AB, can be written as |ψsource〉 =∑
i ci|ui〉A|vi〉B . Then the Schmidt decomposition of|Φ〉ABE , with respect to system A and the composite sys-
tem BE, is of the form |Φ〉ABE =
∑
i ci|ui〉A|e˜i〉BE since
ci and |ui〉A are fixed by the known reduced density ma-
trix ρA to the corresponding values of |ψsource〉AB . Then
one can find a suitable unitary operator UBE such that
|e˜i〉BE = UBE |vi〉B|0〉E where |0〉E is an initial state of
an auxiliary system.
For simplicity, we consider a special class of measure-
ment strategies for Eve. This class of measurements can
be thought of as a two step procedure:
(1) First, Eve distinguishes contributions com-
ing from the part with symmetric extension and
from the part without symmetric extension of
ρAB. The corresponding measurements are pro-
jections of Eve’s subsystem onto the orthogonal
subspaces Πext =
∑
i |tk = ext, fi〉〈tk = ext, fi| and
Πne =
∑
j |tk = ne, fj〉〈tk = ne, fj|.
(2) Afterwards, Eve performs a refined measurement
strategy on each subspace separately. As we will see,
only the non-extendible part ρne might allow Alice and
Bob to distill a secret key by direct communication; from
the extendible part no secret key can be obtained.
We shall label Eve’s measurement outcomes ek with
two variables, ek = (tk, fk). The first variable tk ∈
{ext, ne} denotes the outcome of the projection measure-
ment, while fk corresponds to the outcome arising from
the second step of the measurement strategy. With prob-
ability p(tk = ne) = 1 − λSmax Eve finds that Alice and
Bob share the non-extendible part of ρAB. After this first
measurement step, the conditional quantum state shared
by Alice, Bob, and Eve, denoted as ρneABE = |Φne〉〈Φne|,
corresponds to a purification of ρne, i.e.,
|Φne〉ABE =
∑
j
√
pj |ψj〉AB|tk = ne, fj〉E . (17)
Next we provide an upper bound for K→ that arises
from this special eavesdropping strategy. Moreover, as
we will see, the obtained upper bound is straightforward
to calculate.
C. Resulting Upper Bound
For the special eavesdropping strategy considered in
Sec. III B, we will show that we can restrict ourselves to
the non-extendible part ρne of a given ρAB only. As a
consequence, the resulting upper bound will only depend
on this non-extendible part. This motivates the defini-
tion of a new equivalence class of quantum states Snemax,
defined as
Snemax = {ρne(ρAB) | ρAB ∈ Smax} , (18)
where ρne(ρAB) represents the non-extendible part in a
valid best extendibility approximation of ρAB ∈ Smax
given by Eq. (11). To simplify the notation, from now
on we will write ρne instead of ρne(ρAB). The possibility
to concentrate on the non-extendible parts only is given
by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 : Suppose Alice’s and Bob’s systems are
subjected to measurements described by the POVMs
{Ai} and {Bj} respectively, and their outcomes follow
the probability distribution pij . They try to distill a se-
cret key by unidirectional classical communication from
Alice to Bob only. The secret key rate, denoted as K→,
is bounded from above by
K→ ≤ (1− λSmax) inf
P∗
S→(A;B|E), (19)
where S→(A;B|E) denotes the classical one-way secret
key rate given by Eq. (4) for a tripartite probability dis-
tribution p˜ijk ∈ P∗. The set P∗ considers all possible
POVMs {Ek} which Eve can perform on a purification
|Φne〉ABE of the non-extendible part ρne ∈ Snemax only,
i.e., p˜ijk = Tr[Ai ⊗Bj ⊗ Ek(|Φne〉ABE〈Φne|)].
Proof : In order to derive Eq. (19) we have considered
only a particular class of eavesdropping strategies for Eve
as described in Sec. III B. This class defines a subset P ′
of the set of all possible extensions P of the observed
data pij to a general tripartite probability distribution
pijk, which are considered in the upper bound given by
Eq. (8). We have, therefore, that
K→ ≤ inf
P
S→(A;B|E) ≤ inf
P′
S→(A;B|E). (20)
As introduced in Sec. III B, we label the outcome
of Eve’s measurement strategy by two variables ek =
(fk, tk), where the value of tk ∈ {ext, ne} labels the out-
come of her projection measurement. For the tripartite
probability distribution p(ai, bj , ek = (fk, tk)) we denote
the secret key rate by S→(A;B|FT ).
For the one-way secret key rate S→(A;B|FT ) we get
S→(A;B|FT ) = sup
U←A
V←U
H(U |V FT )−H(U |V B)
≤ sup
U←A
V←U
H(U |V FT )−H(U |V BT )
≤ sup
U←AT
V←U
H(U |V FT )−H(U |V BT ). (21)
In the first line we just use the definition of the classi-
cal secret key rate given by Eq. (4). The first inequality
comes from the fact that conditioning can only decrease
6the entropy, i.e., H(U |V B) ≥ H(U |V BT ). For the last
inequality, we give Alice also access to the random vari-
able T , additionally to her variable A, over which she
can perform the post-processing. Altogether Eq. (21)
tells that if Eve announces publicly the value of the vari-
able T , so whether Alice and Bob share the extendible
or non-extendible part, that this action can only enhance
Alice and Bob’s ability to create a secret key.
Next, we have that
sup
U←AT
V←U
H(U |V FT )−H(U |V BT )
= sup
U←AT
V←U
∑
p(tk)
{
H(U |V Ftk)−H(U |V Btk)
}
=
∑
p(tk) sup
U←Atk
V←U
{
H(U |V Ftk)−H(U |V Btk)
}
=
∑
p(tk)S
tk
→(A;B|F ). (22)
First we rewrite the conditional entropies in terms of
an expectation value over the parameter tk. The map
U ← AT acts independent on each term of the sum over
tk. Therefore the supremum can be put into the sum tak-
ing the specific value of tk. Since supU←Atk is equal to
supU←A for tk fixed, we find on the right hand side the
one-way secret key rate for the conditional three party
correlation p(ai, bj , fl|tk) denoted as Stk→(A;B|F ).
Combining Eqs. (21,22) we have, therefore, that
S→(A;B|FT ) ≤
∑
p(tk)S→(A;B|F ;T = tk). (23)
From Observation 1 we learn that Alice and Bob can-
not draw a secret key out of the extendible part σext,
i.e., S→(A;B|E; tk = ext) = 0. Therefore, only the
non-extendible part ρne can contribute to a positive se-
cret key rate. The conditional probability distribution
p(ai, bj, fk|tk = ne) ≡ p˜ijk defines exactly the considered
extensions P∗. This concludes the proof. 
The upper bound given by Eq. (19) requires to solve
the infimum over all possible extensions P∗. Instead of
this optimization, one can just pick a particular state
Snemax and calculate the infimum over all possible mea-
surements {Ek} employed by Eve.
Corollary 1 : Given a state ρne ∈ Snemax, the secret key
rate K→ is bounded from above by
K→ ≤ (1 − λSmax) inf
Ek
SEk→ (A;B|E), (24)
with SEk→ (A;B|E) being the classical one-way secret key
rate of the tripartite probability distribution p˜ijk =
Tr(Ai⊗Bj ⊗Ek (|Φne〉〈Φne|)), and where |Φne〉 denotes
a purification of ρne.
Proof : The right hand side of Eq. (24) is an upper
bound of the right hand side of Eq. (19), because in Eq.
(24) we take only a particular state ρne ∈ Snemax, whereas
in Eq. (19) we perform the infimum over all possible
states ρne ∈ Snemax. 
The upper bounds provided by Theorem 1 and Corol-
lary 1 still demand solving a difficult optimization prob-
lem. Next, we present a simple upper bound on K→
that is straightforward to calculate. Then, in Sec. IV,
we illustrate the performance of this upper bound for
two well-known QKD protocols: the four-state [3] and
the six-state [29] QKD schemes. We compare our results
to other well-known upper bounds on K→ for these two
QKD schemes [1, 19–22].
Corollary 2 : The secret key rateK→ is upper bounded
by
K→ ≤ (1− λSmax) Ine(A;B), (25)
where Ine(A;B) denotes the classical mutual information
calculated on the probability distribution p˜ij = Tr(Ai ⊗
Bj ρne) with ρne ∈ Snemax.
Proof : According to Eq. (6), the one-way secret key
rate S→(A;B|E) is bounded from above by the mutual
information I(A;B). Note that the mutual information
I(A;B) is an upper bound on the secret key rate for
arbitrary communication protocols [32]. 
The main difficulty when evaluating the upper bound
given by Eq. (25) for a particular realization of QKD
relies on obtaining the parameter λSmax and the non-
extendible state ρne. In App. B we show how this prob-
lem can be cast as a convex optimization problem known
as semidefinite program [51]. Such instances of convex
optimization problems can be efficiently solved, for ex-
ample by means of interior-point methods [23, 24].
IV. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the upper bound on K→
given by Eq. (25) for two well-known qubit-based QKD
protocols: the four-state [3] and the six-state [29] QKD
schemes. We select these two particular QKD schemes
because they allow us to compare our results with al-
ready known upper bounds on K→ [1, 19–22]. Let us
emphasize, however, that our method can also be used
straightforwardly to obtain an upper bound for higher di-
mensional, more complicated QKD protocols, for which
no upper bounds have been calculated yet. By means of
semidefinite programming one can easily obtain the max-
imum weight of extendibility λSmax and the corresponding
non-extendible part ρne which suffice for the computation
of the upper bound. (See App. B.)
In the case of the four-state EB protocol, Alice and Bob
perform projection measurements onto two mutually un-
biased bases, say the ones given by the eigenvectors of the
two Pauli operators σx and σz . In the corresponding PM
scheme, Alice can use as well the same set of measure-
ments but now on a maximally entangled state. Note
that here we are not using the general approach intro-
duced previously, |ψsource〉AB =
∑
i
√
pi|αi〉A|ϕi〉B, to
model PM schemes, since for these two protocols it is suf-
ficient to consider that the effectively distributed quan-
tum states consist only of two qubits. For the case of the
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FIG. 1: Upper bound on the one-way secret key rateK→ given
by Eq. (25) for the four-state (solid) and the six-state (dotted)
QKD protocols in comparison to known lower bounds on the
secret key rate given in Ref. [1]. The equivalence class of states
S is fixed by the observed data pij , which are generated via
measurements onto the state ρAB(e) = (1−2e)|ψ
+〉
AB
〈ψ+|+
e/21 AB . The quantum bit error rate is given by QBER = e.
Here we assume an asymmetric basis choice to suppress the
sifting effect [38].
six-state EB protocol, Alice and Bob perform projection
measurements onto the eigenvectors of the three Pauli
operators σx, σy , and σz on the bipartite qubit states dis-
tributed by Eve. In the corresponding PM scheme Alice
prepares the eigenvectors of those operators by perform-
ing the same measurements on a maximally entangled
two-qubit state.
We model the transmission channel as a depolarizing
channel with error probability e. This defines one pos-
sible eavesdropping interaction. In particular, the ob-
served probability distribution pij is obtained in both
protocols by measuring the quantum state ρAB(e) = (1−
2e)|ψ+〉AB〈ψ+|+e/21AB, where the state |ψ+〉AB repre-
sents a maximally entangled two-qubit state as |ψ+〉AB =
1/
√
2(|00〉AB + |11〉AB), and 1AB denotes the identity
operator. The state ρAB(e) provides a probability distri-
bution pij that is invariant under interchanging Alice and
Bob. This means that for this particular example there
is no difference whether we consider direct communica-
tion (extension of ρAB(e) to two copies of system B) or
reverse reconciliation (extension of ρAB(e) to two copies
of system A). The quantum bit error rate (QBER), i.e.,
the fraction of signals where Alice and Bob’s measure-
ments results differ, is given by QBER = e.
The resulting upper bounds on K→ are illustrated in
Fig. 1. These results do not include the sifting factor of
1/2 for the four-state protocol (1/3 for the six-state pro-
tocol), since this effect can be avoided by an asymmetric
basis choice for Alice and Bob [38].
Let us consider in more detail the cut-off points for
K→, i.e., the values of QBER for which the secret key
rate drops down to zero in Fig. 1. We find that in the
four-state protocol (six-state protocol) one-way secret
key distillation might only be possible for a QBER <
14.6 (QBER < 1/6). These results reproduce the well-
known upper bounds on both protocols from Refs. [20–
22]. More recently, a new upper bound for the six-state
protocol was obtained in Refs. [1, 19], QBER / 16.3.
This result indicates that the upper bound given by Eq.
(25) is not tight, since it fails to reproduce this last value.
More importantly, both statements together entail that
Observation 1 is necessary but not sufficient for one-way
secret key distillation: there exist bipartite states which
are non-extendible, nevertheless no secret key can be ob-
tained from them via one-way post-processing. It shows
that the characterization of useful quantum states for
one-way QKD is still an open problem. Finally, let us
mention that the threshold point for the four-state pro-
tocol computed in Ref. [1, 19] lead to the same cut-off
point as for the optimal approximate cloner attack and
thus also coincides with the value of our result.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we address the fundamental question of
how much secret key can be obtained from the classical
data that become available once the first phase of QKD is
completed. In particular, we restrict ourselves to one-way
public communication protocols between the legitimate
users. This question has been extensively studied in the
literature and analytic expressions for upper and lower
bounds on the one-way secret key rate are already known.
Unfortunately, to evaluate these expressions for particu-
lar QKD protocols is, in general, a non-trivial task. It de-
mands to solve difficult optimization problems for which
no general solution is known so far.
Here we provide a simple method to obtain an up-
per bound on the one-way secret key rate for QKD. It
is based on a necessary precondition for one-way secret
key distillation: The legitimate users need to prove that
there exists no quantum state having a symmetric ex-
tension that is compatible with the available measure-
ments results. The main advantage of the method is
that it is straightforward to calculate, since it can be
formulated as a semidefinite program. Such instances
of convex optimization problems can be solved very ef-
ficiently. More importantly, the method applies both to
prepare and measure schemes and to entanglement based
schemes, and it can reproduce most of the already known
cut-off points for particular QKD protocols. Recent re-
sults show that the given precondition is only necessary
but not sufficient, so there exists non-extendible quan-
tum state which nevertheless are useless for one-way key
distillation.
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APPENDIX A: QKD WITH MIXED SIGNAL
STATES
In this Appendix we describe very briefly the case of
QKD based on mixed quantum states instead of pure
states. In particular, we analyze PM schemes, since in
EB schemes it is clear that Eve can always distribute
mixed states to Alice and Bob, and this situation is al-
ready contained in the results included in the previous
sections. More specifically, we translate the necessary
precondition for secret key generation by unidirectional
communication to the PM mixed state scenario.
In the most general PM scheme, Alice prepares mixed
signal states ρiB following a given probability distribu-
tion pi and sends them to Bob. Equivalently, we can
think of the preparation process as follows. Suppose that
the spectral decomposition of the signal state ρiB is given
by ρiB =
∑
j λ
i
j |ϕij〉B〈ϕij |. This can be interpreted as
producing with probability λij the pure state |ϕij〉. Alter-
natively, ρiB can as well originate from a pure state in a
higher dimensional Hilbert space. That is, from a possi-
ble purification |φi〉A′B of the state ρiB in the composite
Hilbert space HA′ ⊗HB which reads as
|φi〉A′B =
∑
j
√
λij |j〉A′ |ϕij〉B. (A1)
Now we can use the same formalism as the one for PM
schemes based on pure signal states. We can assume that
first Alice prepares the tripartite quantum state
|ψsource〉AA′B =
∑
ij
√
piλij |i〉A|j〉A′ |ϕij〉B. (A2)
Afterwards, in order to produce the actual signal state
in system B, Alice performs a measurement onto the
standard basis of system A only, and completely ignores
system A′. Her measurement operators are given by
Ai = |i〉A〈i|⊗1A′ . The produced signal states are sent to
Bob who measures them by means of the POVM {Bj}.
Since Eve can only interact with system B, the reduced
density matrix of ρAA′ = TrB(|ψsource〉AA′B〈ψsource|)
is fixed by the actual preparation scheme. This infor-
mation can be included in the measurement process by
adding to the observables measured by Alice and Bob
other observables {Ck,AA′ ⊗ 1B} such that they provide
complete information on the bipartite Hilbert space of
Alice HAA′ = HA ⊗HA′ . (See also [52].)
The relevant equivalence class of quantum states
SAA′B contains all tripartite quantum states ρAA′B con-
sistent with the available information during the mea-
surement process. Obviously, Eve can always access ev-
ery purification |ΨAA′BE〉 of a state in SAA′B. Note that
the situation is completely equivalent to the case of pure
signal states [7].
Now we are ready to rephrase the necessary precon-
dition for one-way secret key distillation for the case of
QKD based on mixed states. For direct communication
we need to search for symmetric extensions to two copies
of system B. That is, if we denote with A¯ the bipar-
tite system on Alice’s side A¯ ≡ AA′, we have to search
for quantum states in the equivalence class SAA′B = SA¯B
which are extendible to ρA¯BB′ . In the case of reverse rec-
onciliation, Eve needs to possess only a copy of system
A. Note that the final key is created only from measure-
ments onto this system. Therefore, in order to determine
the cut-off points for the key distillation process, one has
to examine the question whether a four-partite quantum
state ρAA′BE with TrE(ρAA′BE) ∈ SAA′B exists such
that TrA′(ρAA′BE) is exactly the desired symmetric ex-
tension to two copies of system A.
APPENDIX B: SEMIDEFINITE PROGRAMS
AND SEARCHING FOR λSmax AND ρne
In this Appendix we provide a method to obtain the
parameter λSmax and the corresponding non-extendible
state ρne. In particular, we show how one can cast
this problem as a convex optimization problem known
as semidefinite programming. Such instances of convex
optimization problems appear frequently in quantum in-
formation theory and they can be solved very efficiently.
There are freely-available input tools like, for instance,
YALMIP [39], and standard semidefinite programming
solvers, see SeDuMi [40] and SDPT3-3.02 [41].
A typical semidefinite problem, also known as primal
problem, has the following form
minimise cTx (B1)
subject to F (x) = F0 +
∑
i
xiFi ≥ 0,
where the vector x = (x1, ..., xt)
T represents the objec-
tive variable, the vector c is fixed by the particular opti-
mization problem, and the matrices F0 and Fi are Her-
mitian matrices. The goal is to minimize the linear ob-
jective function cTx subject to a linear matrix inequality
constraint F (x) ≥ 0 [23, 24]. (See also Ref. [53].)
Any bounded Hermitian operator ρA = ρ
†
A acting on
a n-dimensional Hilbert space S can be written in terms
of an operator basis, which we shall denote by {Sk}, sat-
isfying the following three conditions: Tr(Sj) = nδj1,
Sj = S
†
j , and Tr(SjSj′) = nδjj′ . A possible choice is
9given by the SU(n) generators. Using this representa-
tion, a general bipartite state ρAB in a dAB-dimensional
Hilbert space can be written as
ρAB =
1
dAB
∑
kl
rklS
A
k S
B
l , (B2)
where the coefficients rkl are given by rkl =
Tr(SAk S
B
l ρAB). Note that in order to simplicity the nota-
tion, in this Appendix we omit the tensor product signs
⊗ between the operators. The representation given by
Eq. (B2) allows us to describe any bipartite density op-
erator in terms of a fixed number of parameters rkl which
can serve as the free parameters in the program.
The knowledge of Alice and Bob’s POVMs {Ai} and
{Bj}, respectively, and the observed probability distri-
bution pij determines the equivalence class of compati-
ble states S. Since every POVM element is a Hermitian
operator itself, every element can as well be expanded
in the appropriate operator basis Ai =
∑
m aimS
A
m and
Bj =
∑
n bjnS
B
n .
An arbitrary operator ρAB = 1/dAB
∑
rklS
A
k S
B
j be-
longs to the equivalence class S if and only if it fulfils
the following constraints: In order to guarantee that the
operator ρAB represents a valid quantum state, it must
be normalized Tr(ρAB) = r11 = 1, and it must be a
semidefinite positive operator ρAB ≥ 0. In addition, it
must reproduce the observed data of Alice and Bob. This
last requirement imposes the following constraints
Pr(ai, bj) =
∑
kl
aikbilrkl = pij ∀i, j, (B3)
which are linear on the state coefficients rkl. Note that
every equality constraint Pr(ai, bj) = pij can be repre-
sented by two inequality constraints as Pr(ai, bj)−pij ≥
0 and −(Pr(ai, bj)− pij) ≥ 0.
In order to find the decomposition of a given state
ρAB = 1/dAB
∑
kl rklS
A
k S
B
l into an extendible part σext
and an non-extendible part ρne, with maximum weight
λmax(ρAB) of extendibility, we can proceed as follows.
First we rewrite the problem in terms of unnormalized
states σ˜ext ≡ λσext and ρ˜ne ≡ (1 − λ)ρne as
ρAB = min
Tr(ρ˜ne)
σ˜ext + ρ˜ne. (B4)
Now assume that the unnormalized, extendible state is
written as σ˜ext = 1/dAB
∑
e˜klS
A
k S
B
l , which must form
a semidefinite positive operator σ˜ext ≥ 0. In the case of
direct communication we have to impose that σ˜ext has a
symmetric extension χABB′ to two copies of system B.
That is, χABB′ remains invariant under permutation of
the systems B and B′. This is only possible if the state
χABB′ can be written as
χABB′ =
1
dABB′
∑
k
l>m
fklm(S
A
k S
B
l S
B′
m + S
A
k S
B
mS
B′
l )
+
∑
kl
fkllS
A
k S
B
l S
B′
l (B5)
with appropriate state coefficients fklm ∀k, ∀l ≥ m.
The extension must as well reproduce the original state
TrB′(χABB′) = σ˜ext, which implies that the state coeffi-
cients of σ˜ext and χABB′ are related by
fkl1 = e˜kl ∀k, l. (B6)
Hence, some of the state parameters of χABB′ are already
fixed by the coefficients of σ˜ext. In addition, the coeffi-
cients fklm have to form a semidefinite positive operator
χABB′ ≥ 0.
Once the states ρAB =
∑
rklS
A
k S
B
l and the unnormal-
ized extendible part σ˜ext =
∑
eklS
A
k S
B
l are fixed, the
remaining non-extendible state ρ˜ne is determined by the
decomposition given by Eq. (B4), and equals to
ρ˜ne = ρAB −
∑
(rkl − ekl)SAk SBl . (B7)
This operator must be semidefinite positive ρne ≥ 0.
In total, the state coefficients of the states in the equiv-
alence class ρAB, the unnormalized, extendible part in
the best extendibility decomposition σ˜ext and the sym-
metric extension itself χABB′ will constitute the objective
variables of the SDP program
x = (rkl, e˜kl, fklm)
T . (B8)
This requires a fixed ordering of the set of coefficients.
The function to be minimized is the weight on the un-
normalized, non-extendible part, Tr(ρ˜ne) = r11 − e˜11.
Hence the vector c is given by
cT = ( 1︸︷︷︸
r11
, 0, · · · , −1︸︷︷︸
e˜11
, 0. · · · ), (B9)
All the semidefinite constraints introduced previously on
the state coefficients can be collected into a single linear
matrix inequality constraint given by Eq. (B1). The
final F (x) collects all these constraints as block-matrices
on the diagonal.
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